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NONPARTISAN SPEECH IN THE POLICE
DEPARTMENT: THE AFTERMATH OF
PICKERING
By Kevin William Finck*
All speech critical of government leaders, policies and practices
manifestly jeopardizes the status quo because it tends to controvert cur-
rently held beliefs. Fully aware of this reality, the Framers of the Con-
stitution weighed the dangers of public discussion and controversy
against the dangers of censorship.' The First Amendment was based
on the premise that the suppression of thought, speech, press or public
assembly is repugnant to the principles of freedom upon which the na-
tion was founded.2 Consequently, Americans may express themselves
on questions of current public interest as a matter of right, without leg-
islative, executive or judicial permission.' In order to keep this consti-
tutional guarantee from becoming illusory, the government must not be
allowed to justify restrictions on free expression by referring to the ad-
verse consequences of allowing certain ideas to enter the public sector.
4
Despite the broad sweep of First Amendment guarantees, courts
are increasingly examining whether and to what extent the govern-
ment's prerogative to hire and discharge employees permits it to regu-
late the conduct of those individuals who would, in the absence of the
employment relationship, be protected from sanction by the First
Amendment. Historically, public employment in the United States was
considered a privilege, not a right, thus the state as an employer could
impose any condition on employment it desired.5 Government em-
* B.A., 1977, University of California, Santa Barbara; member, third year class.
1. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 531 (1958) (Black, J., concurring).
2. See id See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis &
Holmes, J.J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes &
Brandeis, J.J., dissenting).
3. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194 (1952) (Black, J., concurring). See also
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369
(1931); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948),
reprinted in A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960).
4. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976). See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(Brandeis & Holmes, J.J., concurring).
5. See Comment, The Unclear Boundaries of the Constitutional Rights of Public Em-
ployees, 44 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 389, 389 (1975).
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ployment was often contingent upon the relinquishment of constitu-
tional rights.6 The applicant could either accept the conditions of
employment or decline the job. As our government has grown and be-
come more pervasive, the number of governmental employees has in-
creased. The rights and liberties of a once small number of
government employees now belong to a more substantial and influen-
tial percentage of the citizenry. Accordingly, those rights now receive
greater recognition and scrutiny.7
A few courts have recently held that a citizen's right to comment
and to engage in open debate is substantially unaffected by government
employment' and that employees cannot be deprived of their jobs
merely because they have exercised these rights.9 Judge Leventhal of
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "whatever liberties a
private employer might have or take, the Government cannot disregard
the Bill of Rights merely by calling on its prerogative to hire and fire
employees."'" However, there remains a strong argument against un-
restricted speech by government employees. With government employ-
ees providing ever increasing, indispensable services, the public interest
demands an administration that is effective, disciplined, and not beset
by the turmoil or anarchy that uninhibited and robust debate can cre-
ate. While a free society values vigorous and essentially unrestrained
public speech by its citizens, such uninhibited speech by government
employees often has an inefficient, disharmonic or even chaotic effect
upon a governmental office." Minor constitutional infringements pro-
vide discipline which can prove indispensable to the efficient continua-
tion of valuable public services.
These opposing interests are especially evident in the exercise of
First Amendment free speech rights by police department employees.
Like other workers in the public sector, police officers who engage in
controversial dialogue critical of management are subject to sanctions
and termination. Although a police department does not have the
6. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). See
also Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff dper curiam by an equally di-
vided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951); Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
7. In 1978, the federal government employed approximately 2.9 million civilians,
while state and local governments employed more than 12.7 million civilians. U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1979, at
313. This means that of the 94.4 million civilians employed in 1978, approximately 16.5%
were working for some governmental organization. As Professor Emerson has noted, any
restrictions placed upon the free speech rights of such a large percentage of the nation's work
force should be a matter of serious concern. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 563 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
9. See, e.g., Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 1970).
10. Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
11. See id. at 833.
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same concern in developing instant unquestioning obedience among its
employees as does a military organization, it, unlike most other govern-
mental employers, does have a substantial interest in developing "disci-
pline, espirit de corps, and uniformity"' 2 among its employees in order
to insure the adequate "promotion of safety of persons and property."'
3
This interest, however, must be balanced against the employee's First
Amendment rights and the right of the public to be informed. 4
In 1968, the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education'5
devised a test designed to balance these various interests when deter-
mining the scope of a government employee's freedom of expression.
The Court refused to establish a general standard suitable for deter-
mining whether the employee's expression was protected,' 6 but it did
indicate several factors which it felt courts should examine when bal-
ancing the competing interests.' 7 The principal virtue of this test is its
flexibility, which allows a court to consider the exigencies of justice in a
particular case with minimal attention to precedent.
Unfortunately, the practice of leaving the lower courts such a large
degree of discretion has created a novel problem for the public servant
desiring to comment on some aspect of his employment. Since every
factual situation is different and the applicable standard outlined in
Pickering is so flexible, a government employee often cannot know
whether his or her speech is protected until a court so decides. Cases
since Pickering have shown that the application of the balancing test
may produce divergent results in similar, if not parallel, factual situa-
tions.'8 Such a lack of uniformity is bound to have a chilling effect on
the exercise of First Amendment rights by the employee who faces po-
tential termination upon the mistaken exercise of such rights. Many
government employees will prefer to abide by possibly unconstitutional
regulations rather than risk their jobs, even if they feel strongly that
their rights are being infringed. Their sole alternative is resistance with
no guarantee of ultimate vindication in the courts. Most public em-
ployees do not have the economic security to take such a risk. This
note will examine the difficulties inherent in the uniform application of
Pickering's balancing test; it will also consider the consequent dilemma
which arises for government employees generally, and for police of-
12. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 246 (1976).
13. Id. at 247.
14. See Kannisto v. City of San Francisco, 541 F.2d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1976).
15. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
16. Id. at 569-73. The Court believed that a general formula was inappropriate due to
the enormous variety of factual situations in which an employee's critical statements might
be deemed to be grounds for dismissal by his or her superiors.
17. See text accompanying notes 62-68 infra.
18. Compare, e.g., Byrd v. Gain, 558 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1977) with Brukiewa v. Police
Comm'r, 257 Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210 (1970).
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ficers in particular, who wish to exercise their free speech right with
regard to nonpartisan matters. 19
I. Historical Framework
Traditionally, public employment was viewed not as a right, but as
a privilege subject to any reasonable condition. 0 Since public employ-
ment was not a constitutionally protected right,2 courts likened the
state to a private employer with an absolute right to discharge.2 2 Gov-
ernment employers were able to dismiss their employees at will-even
if the termination was prompted by an employee's exercise of his or her
constitutional rights.2" Although conditions placed upon public em-
ployment often interfered with the employee's constitutional rights,
those rights were not deemed violated because the restrictions were ac-
cepted voluntarily.24
The most famous case exhibiting the state's power to set conditions
on employment was McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford.25 In McAu-
iffie, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the dismissal of
a policeman for violating regulations which prohibited officers from
joining political committees or soliciting money for political purposes.
Justice Holmes articulated the rationale for the state's authority to re-
strain freedom of speech as a condition of public employment: "The
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman. 26 Holmes' rationale displayed
remarkable vitality.27 His quote continued to haunt public employees
19. Governmentally imposed limitations on public employee's partisan speech present
different concerns from those expressed in this article. See Martin, The Constitutionality of
the Hatch Act. Second Class Citizenship for Public Employees, 6 U. TOL. L. REv. 78 (1974);
Note, Freedom of Political Activityfor Civil Servants: An Alternative to Section 9(a) of the
Hatch Act, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 626 (1973); Note, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n: PoliticalActivity and Government Employment, 46 TEMP.
L.Q. 606 (1973).
20. See Note, Nonpartisan Freedom of Expression of Public Employees, 76 MICH. L.
REv. 365 (1977); Note, First Amendment andPublic Employees: Times Marches On, 57 GEo.
L.. 134 (1968).
21. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), a'dper curiam by an equaly
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951); Board of Educ. v. Swan, 41 Cal. 2d 546, 261 P.2d 261
(1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1954); Christal v. Police Comm'n, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92
P.2d 416 (1939); Goldsmith v. Board of Educ., 66 Cal. App. 152, 225 P. 783 (1924); Klein v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 152 N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1967).
22. See Note, First Amendment andPublic Employees. Times Marches On, 57 GEO. LJ.
134, 135 (1968).
23. See Clifford v. Scannell, 74 A.D. 406, 77 N.Y.S. 704 (1902), aff'd mem., 173 N.Y.
606, 66 N.E. 1114 (1903); Duffy v. Cooke, 239 Pa. 427, 86 A. 1076 (1913).
24. See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
25. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
26. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
27. As recently as 1952 the Supreme Court stated that teachers must work in public
1004
for years through its subsequent use by both courts28 and governmental
29agencies.
The ability of government employers to encroach upon the consti-
tutional rights of employees can also be seen in the "gag rules" which
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft imposed on
federal employees by executive decree.3" These executive orders forced
federal employees to submit employment-related grievances to their re-
spective department heads before they could petition Congress for re-
view. The silencing effect which these orders had on information
dealing with deficiencies in government service prompted Congress in
1912 to pass the Lloyd-La Follette Act, which established the right of
federal employees to petition Congress.'
One often overlooked reason for the continued suppression of
public employees' constitutional rights over such a prolonged period is
that, until quite recently, government workers often failed to assert
their due process and free speech rights in court. In State v. Turner,
3 2
for example, a Florida public school teacher, who was a conscientious
objector during World War II, was dismissed from his position after
making public statements expressing his unwillingness to aid the
United States in the ongoing conflict. The issue of free speech was
never raised in the mandamus proceeding against his employer. The
Florida Supreme Court refused reinstatement and held that Turner
had a statutory duty as a teacher to teach patriotism and that his refusal
to defend his country rendered him incompetent to teach in a public
schools according to the "reasonable terms" set down by the state and "[i]f they do not
choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and
go elsewhere." Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
28. See McKittrick v. Kirby, 349 Mo. 988, 1006, 163 S.W.2d 990, 996 (1942).
29. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 n.34 (1947); Meehan v.
Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
30. Executive Order No. 402, 1 PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS 42 (1906), amending
Executive Order No. 163, id. at 17 (1902), was issued by President Roosevelt and provided
in part:
"All officers and employees of the United States of every description serving in or under
any of the Executive Departments or independent Government establishments, and whether
so serving in or out of Washington, are hereby forbidden, either directly or indirectly, indi-
vidually or through associations, to solicit an increase of pay or to influence or attempt to
influence in their own interest any other legislation whatever, either before Congress or its
Committees, or in any way save through the heads of the Departments or independent Gov-
ernment establishments in or under which they serve, on penalty of dismissal from the Gov-
ernment service."
President Taft issued a similar order in 1909. Executive Order No. 1142, 1 PRESIDENTIAL
EXECUTIVE ORDERS 103 (1909).
31. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501, 7701 (1970),formerly5 U.S.C. § 652(d) (1912). It should be noted
that the Act held each petitioning employee liable for the content of his petition, and pro-
tected the employee only from purely retaliatory action.
32. 155 Fla. 270, 19 So. 2d 832 (1944).
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school.
33
In 1952, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the constitu-
tionality of New York's Feinberg Law, which authorized the dismissal
of any public school teacher who belonged to an organization classified
as "subversive" by the State Board of Regents. In the resulting opin-
ion, Adler v. Board of Education,34 the Court recognized that while
teachers "have the right under our law to assemble, speak, think and
believe as they will. . . they have no right to work for the State ... on
their own terms."35 Evidently, the plight of the public employee had
not undergone much improvement during the sixty years following Mc-
Auliffe.
Especially distressing was the Court's continued emphasis on the
voluntary nature of government employment. That is, the government
employee could choose between the unrestricted exercise of his consti-
tutional rights and his job. This reasoning overlooks the job market
realities for many professionals, such as school teachers and police of-
ficers, who essentially must either rely on the government as an em-
ployer or face unemployment.36
But the decision in Adler was not unanimous. Only Justice Black
and Justice Douglas seemed to recognize the fallacy of the majority's
assumption. In their dissent in Adler, they asserted that the right of a
teacher to retain his or her job should depend, not on the traditional
doctrine of privilege, but on whether the teacher's "performance within
the public school system meets professional standards."
37
Nine months after Adler was decided, the Supreme Court, in
Wieman v. pdegraff38 further explained its statement that public em-
ployees have no right to work for the state on their own terms: "To
draw from this language the facile generalization that there is no con-
stitutionally protected right to public employment is to obscure the is-
sue."39 The Court deemed it unnecessary even to consider whether a
right to public employment existed.40 Instead, two factors were estab-
lished for use when examining loyalty oath cases: the relationship of
the oath to the employee's fitness for the position and the effect upon
the employee's First Amendment rights.
4 1
33. Id. at 277, 19 So. 2d at 833-34.
34. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
35. Id. at 492 (citing United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947)).
36. This is analyzed in greater detail in Chafee, Thirt-Five Years with Freedom of
Speech, 1 KAN. L. REv. 1 (1952).
37. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 511 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
39. Id. at 191.
40. Id. at 192.
41. This new approach was more fully delineated in Slochower v. Board of Higher
Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956), where the Court reversed a decision which had affirmed the
discharge of a college professor who had invoked his Fifth Amendment rights before a con-
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It was not until the 1960's, however, that the Court's changing atti-
tude towards public employment, as suggested in Wieman, produced a
discernible shift away from the McA u/ire reasoning.42 A change in the
composition and prevailing constitutional philosophy of the Court pro-
duced a tribunal unwilling to accept the traditional argument that the
state has virtually unlimited power to place restrictions upon the privi-
lege of public employment.43 Sherbert v. Verner,' although not a pub-
lic employment case, nevertheless demonstrated the Court's new
posture: "It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion
and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing conditions
upon a benefit or privilege."45 Any remaining doubt over the validity
of Adler was dispelled in Key/shian v. Board of Regents,' where the
same New York statute upheld in Adler was declared unconstitu-
tional.47 In Garrity v. New Jersey,4" decided during the same term, the
gressional committee investigating subversive activities within the American educational
system. Noting the effect of such a discharge on the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights, the Court emphasized that the reason for the discharge had no relationship to the real
issue-Slochower's fitness to teach. The Court held that such a dismissal violated due proc-
ess. Id. at 559.
42. Several cases immediately following Wieman appeared to be reversionary and in-
consistent. See Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); Lerner v. Casey, 357
U.S. 468 (1958); Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958). In Beilan, for example, a
public school teacher was fired for failing to answer his employer's questions dealing with
alleged subversive activities. In upholding the dismissal, the Court feebly attempted to dis-
tinguish Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (see discussion in note 41,
supra), by emphasizing that Beilan had not been fired for invoking a constitutional right:
"The Board based its dismissal upon petitioner's refusal to answer any inquiry about his
relevant activities-not upon those activities themselves." Id. at 405-06. This distinction is
one of form, not of substance. Even if the Board did not violate Beilan's First Amendment
rights, its action violated his Fifth Amendment rights since the dismissal was based on his
failure to answer the Board's questions. See also Comment, Teachers and the First Amend-
meat, 7 WILLAMETTE L.J. at 438 n.15.
43. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Ellbrandt v. Russel, 384 U.S. I 1
(1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S.
278 (1961); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
44. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court declared unconstitutional a South Caro-
lina statute which denied unemployment compensation to a Seventh Day Adventist who
could not find employment because of her religious beliefs which forbade her to work on
Saturday.
45. Id. at 404 (footnote omitted).
46. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
47. Justice Brennan, author of the Court's opinion, stated that the "constitutional doc-
trine which has emerged since [Adler] has rejected its major premise. That premise was that
public employment . . . may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights
which could not be abridged by direct government action." Id. at 605. Brennan concluded
that "[t]he theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected
to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected." Id. at 605-
06.
48. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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Court held that public employees retained certain constitutional rights.
"There are rights of constitutional stature [including the right of free
speech] whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a
price."49 This erosion of the traditional concept of rights and privi-
leges5" created the need for a new judicial standard from which to de-
termnine the First Amendment rights of public employees.
II. The New Standard: An Examination of Pickering
Since the rejection of the right-privilege distinction, Pickering v.
Board of Education51 has become the legal prototype for deciding cases
involving public employees' non-partisan speech. Pickering involved
the dismissal of an Illinois teacher for writing a letter to a newspaper
editor which was critical of the Board of Education's management of
revenue raising proposals and the Board's allocation of financial
resouces between the educational and athletic programs of the school.
The Board of Education maintained that the published letter was
"'detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the
schools of the district.' "52 Agreeing with this line of argument, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court affirmed the Board's action. 3 The United States
Supreme Court, however, rejected the suggestion that "teachers may
constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights
they would otherwise enjoy as citizens"" as a condition of employ-
ment. The Court, reversed the lower court's decision and ordered Pick-
ering's reinstatement.
On the one hand, the Court recognized that the state, as an em-
ployer, may have a greater interest in regulating the speech of its em-
ployees than in regulating the speech of other citizens.55
The Pickering Court also recognized, however, that public em-
ployees are in an extraordinary position to observe and comment on
how their governmental departments function.56 Cognizant that the
threat of dismissal is an effective method of inhibiting speech,5 7 the
Court found it essential that public employees "be able to speak out
49. Id. at 500.
50. In Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968), vacated on rehearingper curiam,
425 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the court reflected that the "constitutional climate of today is
different from that of 1892"when Justice Holmes struck off his oft-quoted phrase." 392 F.2d
at 832. The court specifically refused to apply Holmes' reasoning in Mc.4ule.
51. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
52. Id. at 564.
53. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 36 IMI. 2d 568, 225 N.E.2d 1 (1967).
54. 391 U.S. at 568.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 572.
57. Id. at 574.
freely on such questions without fears of retaliatory dismissal. ' 58 Only
by being free from the threat of dismissal or sanction will a public em-
ployee be willing to inform the public of deficiencies in government
departments which provide important public services. In order to de-
termine when a state's interests are sufficient to restrict its employee's
speech, the Court adopted an ad hoc balancing test whereby the em-
ployee's interest in his right to comment upon matters of public con-
cern is weighed against the state's interest in promoting the efficiency of
public service. 9 As the public's concern with being informed on a par-
ticular matter increases, the state must show a more compelling interest
in order to justify its restriction of speech on the subject. Conversely,
the more disruptive a statement is to the maintenance of a high level of
government service, the greater is the government's and the public's
interest in restricting the speech. Thus, the public's interest may work
either for or against the government employee's expression, depending
upon the context and consequences of the speech involved. Restriction
of a public employee's speech will be allowed if there has been a show-
ing that the speech in question injured a substantial public interest60 or
rendered the employee incompetent to perform his or her job.6'
The problem of how to balance conflicting public interests is per-
plexing and difficult to solve. The Court in Pickering refused to con-
struct a generally applicable standard for determining when the
expression of public employees is constitutionally protected. The Jus-
tices believed that a uniform formula would necessarily be too rigid to
adequately administer the enormous variety of factual situations in
which statements by public employees may be deemed to justify dis-
missal. 2 The Court, however, did indicate a number of factors which
should be considered when balancing the competing interests. Rele-
vant variables which support a state's interest in suppressing an em-
58. Id. at 572.
59. Id. at 568.
60. See id. See also Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886 (1961); Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972, 979 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
61. See Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976); Lefcourt v. Legal Aid
Soc'y, 445 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1971). Although some courts have applied Pickering's balanc-
ing test to speech which reveals an employee's incompetence, there is language in the
Supreme Court's opinion which implies that they are not obligated to do so. The Court
noted that the case before it did "not present a situation in which a teacher's public state-
ments are so without foundation as to call into question his fitness to perform his duties in
the classroom. In such a case, of course, the statements would merely be evidence of the
teacher's general competence, or lack thereof, and not an independent basis for dismissal."
391 U.S. at 573 n.5.
Apparently, a public employee's dismissal for incompetence can be based solely on his
or her speech. By treating the employee's speech as evidence of incompetency, an employer
may be able to avoid the free speech protection Pickering's balancing test provides in dismis-
sal proceedings.
62. 391 U.S. at 569.
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ployee's expression include: the maintenance of discipline by
immediate superiors; 63 the preservation of harmony among co-work-
ers;64 the fostering of personal loyalty and confidence when necessary
to the proper functioning of a particular working relationship or em-
ployment position;65 the promotion of efficiency in government opera-
tions;6 6 and the ability of the government to rebut false statements
made by its employees without undue difficulty.67 The Court also
listed several factors which support an employee's interest in free ex-
pression and militate against the government's interest in the restriction
of-speech: whether the statement involves a matter of legitimate public
concern; whether the speech was made in a public context; and the like-
lihood that the employee would have an informed opinion on the sub-
ject.
6 8
Since none of the factors favoring suppression were present in
Pickering, and the statement did involve an issue of public concern, the
Court concluded that the speech in question did not justify the dismis-
sal. As the fact of employment was only "tangentially and insubstan-
tially involved"6 9 in the subject matter of the teacher's statement, the
Board's interest in restricting Pickering's speech could be no greater
than its interest in restricting similar expression by a member of the
general public.70 Consequently, "[a]bsent proof of false statements
knowingly or recklessly made. . . [his] exercise of his right to speak on
issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal
from public employment."7
The absence of factors favoring the state's interest in suppression
63. Id. at 570.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 570 n.3. The Court observed that: "[it] is possible to conceive of some posi-
tions in public employment in which the need for confidentiality is so great that even com-
pletely correct public statements might furnish a permissible ground for dismissal. Likewise,
positions in public employment in which the relationship between superior and subordinate
is of such a personal and intimate nature that certain forms of public criticism of the super-
visor by the subordinate would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the working rela-
tionship between them can also be imagined." Id.
66. See 391 U.S. at 568.
67. Id. at 572.
68. Id. at 569-73.
69. Id. at 574.
70. Id. at 572-73.
71. Id. at 574. Even if Pickering's balancing test favors the employee, proof of know-
ingly or recklessly made false statements critical of the public employer by an employee may
provide the basis for the employee's dismissal. This standard is essentially identical to the
"actual malice" standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S, 254,288 (1964), and
applies only after the balancing test has been resolved in favor of the employee. See Note,
Judicial Protection of Teacher's Speech: The Aftermath of Pickering, 59 IowA L. REy. 1256,
1264. Because an examination of cases subsequent to Pickering reveals little judicial adher-
ence to the application of the actual malice standard in the context of public employment,
this note will confine itself primarily to the balancing test enunciated in Pickering.
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made it unnecessary for the Pickering Court to indicate how varying
combinations of such circumstances should be weighed in the proposed
balance. Not only did the Court refrain from designating the relative
weight to be accorded the various factors, but it failed to indicate how
many, if not all, of the factors needed to be resolved in the employee's
favor before a dismissal from public employment would be over-
turned.72 By confining its holding to the narrow facts before it and
finding it neither "appropriate [n]or feasible" to establish broader stan-
dards against which all public statements by government employees
should be judged,73 the Pickering Court forced lower courts to develop
their own guidelines for applying the balancing test. While the result-
ing judicial interpretations of the Pickering test have been plentiful,
they have not always been consistent. 74
III. The Teacher-Policeman--Soldier Correlation
Since the decision in Pickering, plaintiffs from all sectors of public
employment have sought reinstatement, damages and other forms of
relief upon being discharged or sanctioned for exercising their First
Amendment rights. Because Pickering dealt only with the First
Amendment rights of a public school teacher, its precedential value in
other areas of public employment was left in doubt. An examination of
cases subsequent to Pickering reveals that lower courts have proceeded
to apply Pickering to a wide range of employment situations, although
not always to the same extent. The extent of a police officer's right to
comment freely about his or her employment, for example, is much less
than that of a teacher but more than that of a soldier.
In a 1970 decision, Brukiewa v. Police Commissioner of Balti-
more,76 the Maryland Court of Appeals, relying on Pickering, reversed
the suspension of a police officer who had made public statements criti-
cal of his department. The lone dissenter, Judge Barnes, argued that
there is a large "difference between the nature and character of the em-
ployment of a teacher and the nature and character of the employment
of a policeman so far as First Amendment rights of free speech are
concerned. 77 He pointed out some of these differences:
72. The Court enumerated the factors to indicate "some of the general lines along
which an analysis of the controlling interests should run." 391 U.S. at 569.
73. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
74. See notes 115-80 and accompanying text infra.
75. See, e.g., Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
937 (1977); Castleberry v. Langford, 428 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Brukiewa v. Police
Comm'r, 257 Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210 (1970); Chalk Appeal, 441 Pa. 376, 272 A.2d 457 (1971);
Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161 (Wyo. 1976).
76. 257 Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210 (1970).
77. Id. at 74, 263 A.2d at 229 (Barnes, J., dissenting). See Note, The Policeman: Must
He Be a Second-Class Citizen with Regard to His First Amendment Rights? 46 N.Y.U. L.
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A teacher in the public school system, by virtue of the position
itself, is expected to stimulate and encourage thought and discus-
sion by his students of conflicting ideas in regard to public issues.
He is expected to keep himself abreast of such issues, have opin-
ions in regard to them and to express them fully and vigorously.
He has no responsibility, as a general matter, for the enforcement
of the criminal laws of the State or municipality. He is not part
of a semi-military organization directly concerned with the pres-
ervation of the public safety and security. In the State employ-
ment spectrum, a teacher by the nature and character of his
employment has the right to exercise the maximum of the right of
free speech. On the other hand, a policeman is directly charged
with the preservation of the public safety and security in a daily
struggle with crime--organized and otherwise-upon which his
life and limb, as well as the lives, bodies and properties of the
citizens within the jurisdiction, depend. To accomplish this pri-
mary public duty, discipline and obedience to the orders of
superiors are of the essence. . . . In short, the policeman by the
nature and character of his public employment has the most
qualified and limited freedom of speech.'
The argument that the First Amendment freedoms of police officers are
more limited than those of other public employees stems from the
premise that the police force usually depends on strict and rigid disci-
pline.79 Regardless of the historical origin of the municipal police
force-whether it arose out of the need to supplement the private citi-
zen's role in keeping the peace s° or an interest in creating a civilian
military-municipal police forces are paramilitary organizations."'
This is reflected in the police force's centralized administrative struc-
ture, hierarchy of command and uniform dress and appearance, all
designed to promote competent public service and harmony within the
department.
82
REv. 536, 537-39 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Policeman). But cf. Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68 (1979), where the Court held that public school teachers, like police officers, perform
a task "that go[es] to the hear of representative government." The Justices reasoned that
"[p]ublic education, like the police function, fulfills a most fundamental obligation of gov-
ernment to its constituency" Id at 75-76 (citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647
(1973) and Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978)).
78. Brukiewa v. Police Comm'r, 257 Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210 (1970). See also Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Byrd v. Gain, 558 F.2d 553, 554 (9th Cir. 1977).
79. See Policeman, supra note 77, at 537.
80. "The Anglo-Saxon police tradition. . . springs from a configuration of attitudes
which were profoundly suspicious of central authority and hostile to the idea of guarding the
local peace with militia." TAFrT & ENGLAND, CRIMINOLOGY 318 (4th ed. 1964). See also
Hall, Legal and SocialAspects ofArrest Without Warrant, 49 HARV. L. Rav. 566, 579 (1936);
Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 135-37 (1953).
81. See Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311,321 (3d Cir. 1977) (Rosenn, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1973).
82. Id See note 81 supra.
Even though many police departments are organized along
paramilitary lines, they remain significantly different in character from
the military.83 Police departments are locally managed and organized,
and are more directly controlled by the electorate. Police officials are
given broad discretion in running a department and dismissals are sub-
ject to review by civil rather than provincial military tribunals. Most
importantly, the discipline necessary for the efficient functioning of the
military and of police forces is not of the same variety. Instant unques-
tioning obedience, while essential for a soldier in action, is not neces-
sary for an effective police force.84 It has even been suggested that the
military model of organization and discipline be discouraged some-
what in police departments because a police officer, unlike a soldier,
must frequently act on his or her own initiative without immediate di-
rection or supervision."
Substantial differences between the public interest in education
and the public interest in safety and order justify a difference in the
standards by which schools and police departments protect themselves
from potentially disruptive speech by their employees.8 6 The question
thus arises: what effect does police employment have on the balancing
test enunciated in Pickering? In Muller v. Conlisk,87 a 1970 case from
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, a major portion of the defend-
ant's brief was devoted to distinguishing Pickering by emphasizing the
difference between teachers and police officers due to the quasi-military
alignment of the police department and its need for rigid internal disci-
pline in order to be effective.88 The court held:
We cannot agree that such considerations make Pickering inap-
plicable. Rather, their possible effect is no more than to influence
the balance which Pickering says must be struck in each case. To
the extent that being a policeman is public employment with
unique characteristics, the right of the employee to speak on mat-
ters concerning his employment with the full freedom of any citi-
zen may be more or less limited. It is not, however, destroyed.89
83. "The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for the im-
position of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be con-
stitutionally impermissible outside it." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974). See Kelley
v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1977); Bence v.
Breier, 501 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1974); Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1973); Muller v.
Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1970).
84. See Greenwald v. Frank, 40 A.D.2d 717, 721-22, 337 N.Y.S. 225, 231-32 (1972)
(Shapiro, J., dissenting), a'd mem., 32 N.Y.2d 862, 346 N.Y.S. 2d 529, 299 N.E.2d 895
(1973). Cf. Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (military discipline is separate from
that of the civilian sector).
85. See W. LEE, A HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND 401-02 (1971).
86. Byrd v. Gain, 558 F.2d 553, 554 (1977).
87. 429 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1970).
88. Id. at 904.
89. Id. (citations omitted).
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Other courts have agreed that while a police officer might be entitled to
less First Amendment protection than other public servants, the unique
character of the employment should be considered as but one element
in the balance of interests in his or her individual case.90
IV. Pickering in Operation: A Flaw in the Balancing Test
A. Causation in Government Employee Discharge Cases
In order to state a cause of action, post-Pickering cases have re-
quired the employee to demonstrate that the speech at issue was pro-
tected under the First Amendment and that it was one of the factors
which led to the imposition of the challenged sanction.9" Until the re-
cent Supreme Court case of M. Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle,92 there was much disagreement concerning just
how large a factor the speech had to be in the decision to implement
the disciplinary action before the suit would be upheld. Some courts
held that governmentally imposed sanctions were unconstitutional only
if the protected expression was the sole reason for their imposition.93
Other courts determined that such sanctions were unconstitutional even
if they were only partially due to the exercise of protected speech.94
Finally, a few courts took the relatively moderate position that such
sanctions were unlawful only if the protected speech was the predomi-
nant cause of the employer's action.95 Those courts which were least
tolerant of disciplinary actions based on protected expression main-
tained that a contrary approach would produce a chilling effect on the
exercise of constitutional rights by public employees96 and would per-
90. See, e.g., Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 1977); Hanneman v.
Breier, 528 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1976); Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir.
1970).
91. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958); Smith v.
Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 339 (10th Cir. 1975); Tygrett v. Washington, 543 F.2d 840, 846 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Ring v. Schlesinger, 502 F.2d 479, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Jarmetta v. Cole, 493
F.2d 1334, 1338 (4th Cir. 1974); Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359, 361 (4th Cir. 1972).
92. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
93. See Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974); Parker v. Graves, 340 F.
Supp. 586, 590 (N.D. Fla. 1972), affrdper curiam, 479 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1973).
94. See, e.g., Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 573 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 520 F.2d
1364, 1367 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 921 (1976); Simard v. Board of Educ., 473
F.2d 988, 995 (2d Cir. 1973); Fluker v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 441 F.2d 201, 210 (5th
Cir. 1971); Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653, 660 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Board of Trustees v.
Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1173-74 (Wyo. 1976).
95. See, e.g., Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171, 1182 (10th Cir. 1975); Frank-
lin v. Atkins, 409 F. Supp. 439,446-47 (D. Colo. 1976), qf'd, 562 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1977);
Turbeville v. Abernathy, 367 F. Supp. 1081, 1086 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
96. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036,
1044 (9th Cir. 1976); Kiishila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 1970).
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mit government employers to terminate employment on seemingly le-
gitimate grounds even though the underlying motives were
unconstitutional. 97 Conversely, those courts which favored the "pre-
dominant test" argued that a rule of causation which allowed the gov-
ernment employee to escape sanctions whenever protected speech
played a part in the disciplinary action would enable the employee to
insure the retention of his position by purposely engaging in constitu-
tionally protected behavior.9"
In Aft. Healthy, the Supreme Court set forth what it viewed as the
constitutionally required standard of causation. In that case, Doyle, an
untenured teacher with a controversial employment record,99 notified a
local radio station about a school memorandum regarding teacher
dress and appearance requirements. Soon afterwards, the school board
allowed Doyle's employment contract to expire. When explaining why
it did not renew Doyle's employment contract, the board cited a "'lack
of tact in handling professional matters'" demonstrated by the phone
call to the radio station and Doyle's use of obscene gestures to reprove
disobedient students. °° Doyle brought suit in federal district court.
The court determined that the telephone call was constitutionally pro-
tected under Pickering and that it was a substantial factor in the
Board's decision not to rehire. In an unpublished opinion, the court
ordered the Board to reinstate Doyle with back pay. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed."0'
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, the
Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment. The Rehnquist
opinion rejected the premise that any employment termination based
substantially on protected behavior is unconstitutional.0" Utilization
97. See Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1976); Gray v. Union County
Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1975).
98. See Franklin v. Atkins, 409 F. Supp. 439, 446 (D. Colo. 1976). Cf. Butler v. Hamil-
ton, 542 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1976), where the court stated that "It]he exercise of a [F]irst
[A]mendment right ... does not insulate a public employee from being discharged for oc-
currences prior to the exercise of the right. Furthermore, the exercise of a constitutional
right does not provide a grace period for a public employee immunizing him from a dis-
charge immediately following such exercise, as long as the exercise of the right did not moti-
vate the dismissal." Id. at 839. See also Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1965),
which held that "[w]hen [the employee's] speech is disruptive of the proper functioning of
the public's business the privilege of governmental employment may be withdrawn without
it being said that he was denied his freedom of speech. To hold otherwise would enable
governmental employees to practice the rankest form of insubordination and safely hide
behind the right of free speech." Id. at 827-28.
99. The trial court found that Doyle had argued with other teachers, complained to
employees of the school cafeteria about the amount of spaghetti served to him, and referred
to students involved in a disciplinary complaint as "sons of bitches." 429 U.S. at 281-82.
100. Id. at 282.
101. No. 75-1382 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 1975).
102. 429 U.S. at 285-87.
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of this standard, according to the Court, would necessitate reinstate-
ment in cases where the employer would have dismissed the employee
even if the constitutionally protected expression had not occurred 0 3
This could place an employee who engages in constitutionally pro-
tected behavior in a more secure position than one who does not.I' 4 In
the Court's view, the proper causation test in a public employee dis-
charge case has not one, but two stages.'0 5 The first stage places the
burden of proof on the employee to show that his or her expression was
constitutionally protected and was a substantial or motivating factor in
the subsequent disciplinary action. 101 Such a showing no longer termi-
nates the inquiry; rather, it initiates thr second stage which shifts the
burden of proof to the employer, who must then prove that it would
have made the same determination regarding the employee's continued
employment even if the constitutionally protected behavior had never
occurred.10 7 As one writer has observed, the Court, in effect, adopted
the district court's "substantial factor" criterion as a threshold test, but
then added a "but for" causation analysis. 08
The causation test adopted in Mt. Healthy appears to place the
discharged employee in the same position in relation to his employer
that he or she would have occupied had no protected speech been
made. In actuality, however, an employee dismissed on constitution-
ally impermissible grounds remains in a far better position to appeal
such a decision than he or she would have been in if the protected
speech had not occurred. While the state as an employer may decline
to renew an employee's contract for "no reason whatever,"' it may
not deny such a renewal in retaliation for the lawful exercise of consti-
tutionally protected speech."0 Since the Constitution does not require
an opportunity for a hearing prior to the nonrenewal of a nontenured
government employee's contract unless it is demonstrated that the deci-
sion not to rehire deprived the employee of a liberty or property inter-
est protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,' the employee who engages in protected speech is in a
better position to obtain judicial review than the employee who refrains
103. Id. at 285.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 287.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Note, The Nonpartisan Freedom of Expression of Public Employees, 76 MIcH. L.
REV. 365, 377 (1977).
109. 429 U.S. at 283-84.
110. In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the Supreme Court held that "even
though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the gov-
ernment may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely." Id. at 597.
11I. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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from such activity." 2 The employee, by proving that a substantial fac-
tor in the termination decision was his or her constitutionally protected
speech, forces the state to demonstrate that the employment would
have been terminated even absent the protected activity. Since presum-
ably the state will find it difficult to make such a showing, placing this
burden on the employer improves the employee's position from what it
would have been had the state not retaliated against his or her exercise
of protected speech." 3 Improperly motivated dismissals can be further
prevented by encouraging conscientious courts to view after-the-fact
rationales for termination with skepticism." 4
B. The Balancing Test in Operation
While M. Healthy clarified the causation issue by establishing a
generally applicable standard, judicial application of the Pickering bal-
ancing test still requires a case-by-case analysis of the relative weights
to be assigned to various governmental and free speech interests." 5 In
practice, the balancing test requires courts to decide each case on its
own facts, with only a minimal amount of attention given to precedent
or to the development of uniform standards against which the legality
112. First Amendment protection encompasses not only the nonrenewal of a public em-
ployee's contract (whether or not he or she has a contractual or tenurial right to renewal),
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972), but it also covers administrative sanc-
tions, see, e.g., Adcock v. Board of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 60, 513 P.2d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr. 676
(1973), as well as job transfers which remove a public employee from a position "uniquely
suited to her talents and desires." Bernasconi v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, 548
F.2d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 1977).
113. See Note, supra note 108, at 377 n.54 (1977).
114. Application of the M. Healthy causation test may endanger the protection of free
expression provided by Pickering if, once the public employee has shown that his or her
dismissal was due in substantial part to the protected speech, the employer is allowed to base
the discharge on fictitious grounds. In Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 434 F. Supp.
1273 (D. Del. 1977), the court determined that the University refused to renew the plaintiff's
employment contract solely because of statements he made about homosexuality. The Uni-
versity argued that certain institutional concerns, including budget difficulties and the need
to establish an affirmative action program, would have forced the plaintiffs dismissal, re-
gardless of his speech. The court rejected these contentions as weak and speculative, noting
that the reasons for dismissal were never even mentioned during the previous grievance
proceeding. Only the court's skepticism of the employer's facially valid justifications for
nonrenewal prevented a dismissal actually based on constitutionally protected speech. See
also Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 39 (3d Cir. 1974); Simard v. Board of Educ.,
473 F.2d 988, 995 (2d Cir. 1973); Muir v. County Council, 393 F. Supp. 915, 933 (D. Del.
1977); Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500, 507-09 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
115. Even the Supreme Court has engaged in such case-by-case analysis. See Givhan v.
Western Line Consolidated School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979), where the Court held unani-
mously that Pickering applies to private, as well as public, expression by public employees.
In so holding, the Court acknowledged that "[p]rivate expression ... may-in some situa-
tions bring additional factors to the Pickering calculus" not present when the employee
speaks publicly. Id. at 415 nA.
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of certain conduct may be measured prior to judicial determination. 116
The primary advantage of such a case-by-case analysis is that it permits
the significance of all competing interests to be considered in each indi-
vidual case, thereby theoretically promoting more equitable results.
Additionally, it avoids the difficulty of establishing a formula generally
applicable to a myriad of factual situations.
Unfortunately, the flexibility and resulting uncertainty inherent in
Pickering's balancing test has created serious problems for many gov-
ernment employees wishing to exercise nonpartisan free speech. Be-
cause each factual situation is different, and the applicable standard so
flexible, the public servant often cannot know whether his or her speech
is protected until a court reviews it. One cannot reasonably assume
that government employers can distinguish between protected and un-
protected speech when such a determination requires the application of
a complicated balancing test. 17 Such judgments are even more diffi-
cult to make when a dramatic and perhaps abrasive incident has just
occurred."' This situation is bound to have a chilling effect on public
employees' First Amendment rights since the exercise of such rights
can result in termination. The public employee may prefer to abide by
possibly unconstitutional regulations rather than risk his or her job,
even if the employee strongly believes that his or her rights are being
infringed. The sole alternative is judicial mediation-a final resort
which may prove unsatisfactory since adjudication does not guarantee
vindication.
The use of a balancing test in order to determine whether or not
certain speech is constitutionally protected has undergone considerable
criticism." 9 Professor Thomas I. Emerson, for instance, asserts that:
[t]he principal difficulty with the ad hoc balancing test is that it
frames the issues in such a broad and undefined way, is in effect
so unstructured, that it can hardly be described as a rule at all.
As a legal doctrine for affording judicial protection to a system of
116. Rosenbloom & Gile, The Current Constitutional.Approach to Public Employment, 23
KAN. L. REv. 249, 249 (1975).
117. There exists a real danger that government employers may fail to consider the com-
peting interests outlined in Pickering when dismissing an employee who has engaged in
protected speech. If the employee successfully challenges such a dismissal--and few em-
ployees probably have the resources to maintain such litigation--the state may still show at
trial that it would have reached the same decision absent the employee's controversial
speech. See Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Aumiller v. University
of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
118. See 429 U.S. at 285.
119. See, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE LI.
877 (1963); Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Bal-
ancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REv. 755 (1963); Grossman, Public Employment and Free Speech.
Can They Be Reconciled?, 24 AD. L. REv. 109 (1972); Rosenbloom & Gille, supra note 116;
Comment, supra note 5, at 394.
freedom of expression, it is not tenable.
120
In an article predating Pickering, Emerson identified several funda-
mental difficulties present in the use of such a test. 12  First, he noted
that a test of this type lacks a hard-core doctrine suitable for guiding a
court in reaching a decision.' 22 Second, he claimed that diligent appli-
cation of the test requires difficult and time-consuming factual determi-
nations which are unsuitable for the judicial process. 23 Third, he
argued that the test giyes almost conclusive weight to legislative judg-
ment because a court utilizing the test is forced to base its decision on
broad policy considerations which are usually more appropriately de-
termined by the legislature than the judiciary. 24 Fourth, he alleged
that the balancing test provides no protection for speech other than that
which is already furnished by the due process clause. 25 Finally, he
contended that since no speech is unequivocally protected until a court
so decides, the test fails to provide the notice which is essential to judi-
cial administration. 1
26
Several of the balancing test's constructional problems can be
traced to the unique factual situation involved in Pickering. In that
case, the Supreme Court concluded that the teacher's letter to the news-
paper had no disruptive effect on the regular operation of the school. 1
27
This forced lower courts to blindly determine how they should balance
in the more common factual situations involving disruptive speech.
Furthermore, since the Supreme Court assigned no weight to the vari-
ous factors to be considered when balancing the state's interests against
the employee's, lower courts have been forced in subsequent cases to
develop the contours of the balancing test. 28 In the absence of detailed
direction, it is not surprising that the lower courts' application of this
innovative doctrine has not always been consistent.
29
The confusion and inconsistency present in the application of
120. Emerson, supra note 119, at 912.
121. Id. at 913-14.




126. Id. at 913-14.
127. 391 U.S. at 572-73.
128. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
129. In Pickering, Justice Marshall recognized the wide range of factual situations which
require a court to determine the scope of employee free speech and he also realized that the
Court's opinion would be of limited assistance to the resolution of such issues. He stated
that: "lilt is possible to conceive of some positions in public employment in which the need
for confidentiality is so great that even completely correct public statements might furnish a
permissible ground for dismissal. Likewise, positions in public employment in which the
relationship between superior and subordinate is of such a personal and intimate nature that
certain forms of public criticism of the superior by the subordinate would seriously under-
mine the effectiveness of the working relationship between them can also be imagined. We
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Pickering's balancing test can plainly be seen by analyzing Byrd v.
Gain,130 a 1977 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case. The controversy
in Byrd resulted from a series of unsolved murders and attempted
murders which terrorized the city of San Francisco between December
1973 and April 1974.'1' All seventeen victims were white, and descrip-
tions by witnesses and survivors vaguely described the assailant as a
black male between the age of twenty and thirty. The San Francisco
Police Department initiated a special investigation into the murders,
assigning the letter "Z" and code name "Zebra" to the shootings. As a
result of the police department's inability to apprehend the murderer
through the use of traditional law enforcement techniques and the in-
creased racial tensions created by the Zebra shootings," 2 the depart-
ment implemented a unique strategy to identify and capture the killer.
All patrolling officers were authorized to detain any person fitting the
vague description of the suspect and to make a pat down search of such
persons for possible weapons. The departmental directive did not re-
quire the patrolling officers to consider a suspect's behavior as a factor
when determining probable cause for detainment. These stop-and-
frisk tactics disproportionately affected black males and immediately
created a heated public controversy. In the midst of this controversy,
police officers Jesse Byrd and Travis Tapia issued a press release and
made other public comments critical of these special police tactics. The
department reprimanded the two officers following complaints by other
police employees. Byrd and Tapia sued in federal district court under
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,13 3 to compel the department to
remove the written reprimands from their personnel files, claiming that
such sanctions violated their First Amendment rights. The district
court granted the defendants' summary judgment motion, and the
plaintiffs appealed.
3 4
In his opinion for the court of appeals, Judge Goodwin made no
reference to the balancing of opposing interests as required by Picker-
ing. 135 Instead, Goodwin pointed to the reasoning developed in two
previous Ninth Circuit cases, Kannisto v. City of San Francisco136 and
intimate no views as to how we would resolve any specific instances of such situations." 391
U.S. at 570 n.3.
130. 558 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978).
131. Williams v. Alioto, 549 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1977) (class action brought to enjoin
officials of the San Francisco Police Department from continuing certain investigative prac-
tices).
132. Some city officials claimed that the Zebra murders produced tensions which created
a danger of racial conflict and violence. Williams v. Alioto, 549 F.2d at 138.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
134. 558 F.2d 553, 554 (9th Cir. 1977).
135. See text accompanying notes 56 & 62-71 supra.
136. 541 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1976).
1020
Phillos v. Adult Probation Department,37 and found that "while First
Amendment rights of employees are deserving of protection against un-
reasonable and arbitrary restriction in the name of institutional policy,
the employee does not have an unqualified right to abuse his employer
in public while remaining on the payroll."' 38 A close examination of
Kannisto and Phillos reveals few similarities in the factual situations
and gravity of interests which would allow those cases to be controlling
in Byrd.
Kannisto was an action which challenged the constitutionality of a
San Francisco Police Department regulation, under which the plaintiff,
a lieutenant, was suspended for making disrespectful and belittling re-
marks about a superior officer while addressing his subordinates during
a morning inspection. 139 The police department initially cited Kan-
nisto's publication of his opinion in a local newspaper as an alternative
reason for his suspension."4 The district court held that such a publi-
cation was constitutionally protected and remanded the case to the Po-
lice Commission because it could not determine what weight the
Commission had given to the invalid reason.' 4 ' Seen in this light, Kan-
nisto should have prompted the Byrd Court to classify Byrd's and
Tapia's press release as constitutionally protected speech.
The Kannisto Court acknowledged Pickering's recognition of gov-
ernment employees' abstract right to comment on matters of public
concern.' 42 The Ninth Circuit asserted that such an interest was sub-
stantial in Kannisto because a police officer is a person "'extraordina-
rily able to inform the public of deficiencies in this important
governmental department.' "'"" The Justices also weighed in the bal-
ance the right of the public to be informed about matters of general
concern."' The court, however, upheld the department's imposition of
sanctions and questioned whether the plaintiff's statements were vital
to informed decision-making by those persons legitimately concerned
with the police force's operations. 45 Even though they regarded the
substance of Kannisto's speech as immaterial to the protection of his
constitutional rights, the court still ruled that its character was relevant
in determining the substantiality of the public's interest in the free flow
of information.4 6 The court determined that the public interest was
137. 491 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1974).
138. 558 F.2d at 554.
139. Kannisto v. City of San Francisco, 541 F.2d 841, 842 (9th Cir. 1976).
140. Id. at 842 n.l.
141. Id See Hanneman v. Breier, 528 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976).
142. 541 F.2d at 843. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
143. 541 F.2d at 843.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 844.
146. Id.
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minimal since Kannisto's speech was limited to insulting a superior of-
ficer's personality. 4 7 Conversely, in Byrd, the public's interest in being
informed was significantly greater because the speech in question con-
cerned police tactics directly affecting the public. The public's interest
in the free flow of information in Byrd was substantial, especially con-
sidering that the police tactics involved were later ruled unconstitu-
tional.'
48
Byrd can be further distinguished from Kannisto by examining the
effect of the contested speech in each case upon the maintenance of
discipline and the preservation of harmony. In Byrd, as in Pickering,
"[t]he statements [were] in no way directed towards any person with
whom appellant would normally be in contact within the course of his
daily work."'14 9 Nor could it be presumed that the statements at issue
either impeded the police officer's proper performance of his daily du-
ties or interfered with the regular operations of the department.
50
Rather, the criticism centered upon questionable departmental pol-
icy. 151 The facts in Kannisto sharply contrast with those in Byrd and
Pickering. A close daily working relationship existed between Kan-
nisto and the object of his criticism. Therefore, questions of harmony
and discipline existed in Kannisto which did not exist in Byrd. As the
147. The San Francisco Police Department imposed sanctions on Kannisto for describ-
ing "his superior as a most 'unreasonable, contrary, vindictive individual,' whose behavior
was 'unreasonable, belligerent, arrogant, contrary and unpleasant."' Id. at 842.
148. See Williams v. Alioto, 549 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1977), where the Ninth Circuit re-
viewed a district court judgment which had held that the police tactics were unconstitu-
tional. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, vacated the judgment of the district court,
and stated that there was no longer an issue in controversy since the Zebra murderers had
been apprehended and the special investigatory methods were no longer necessary. Id. at
142-45.
149. 391 U.S. at 569-70. One recent attempt to define "insubordination" required that
there be a close working relationship existing between the employee and the object of his
criticism. The court defined insubordination as disobedience of orders, infraction of rules,
or unwillingness to submit to authority. Nebraska Dep't of Roads Employee Ass'n v. De-
partment of Roads, 364 F. Supp. 251 (D. Neb. 1973).
150. While it is true that the plaintiffs' comments in Byrd provoked other officers' com-
plaints, 558 F. Supp. at 554, the disruptive value of the speech within the department was
minimal when one compares the massive amount of public criticism of the police depart-
ment's tactics. See Williams v. Alioto, 549 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1977).
151. See Comment, Government Employee Disclosures ofAgency Wrongdoing: Protecting
the Right to Blow the Whistle, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 530 (1975); Comment, Government Infor-
mation Leaks and the First Amendment, 64 CAL. L. REv. 108 (1976). See generally R. NA-
DER, J. PETKAS, & K. BLACKWELL, WHISTLE BLOWING (1972).
Emphasizing the right of a government employee to comment on matters of public
concern, Justice Marshall has asserted that "[t]he importance of Government employees be-
ing assured of their right to freely comment on the conduct of Government, to inform the
public of abuses of power and of the misconduct of their superiors, must be self-evident in
these times." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 228 (1974) (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas
and Brennan, J.J., dissenting).
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court concluded, Kannisto's tirade, "delivered as it was before his men
while in formation for inspection, can be presumed to have had a sub-
stantial disruptive influence on the regular operation of the depart-
ment." 
15 2
As in Kannisto, there exist substantial differences in the factual sit-
uations and gravity of interests involved in Phillis v. Adult Probation
Department'53 which render that case minimally valuable as precedent
for resolving Byrd. Phillips was a deputy probation officer in the Fam-
ily Support Section of the Adult Probation Department of the City and
County of San Francisco. In September 1970, Phillips placed a large
poster on the wall of his office which contained the legend "Wanted by
the F.B.I."' 54 Beneath the legend were likenesses of H. Rap Brown,
Angela Davis and Eldridge Cleaver, who were at that time fugitives
sought by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Below the three draw-




Protests by co-workers persuaded a supervisor to order Phillips to re-
move the poster. Phillips' refusal to obey the order led to a five-day
suspension. Phillips brought suit for injunctive and compensatory re-
lief, claiming that his suspension was constitutionally impermissible.1
5 6
In affirming the district court's decision denying relief,15 7 the Ninth
Circuit emphasized two points which compelled it to hold that the gov-
ernment interest in promoting the efficiency of public service out-
weighed the appellant's right of expression.' 58 First, the court
distinguished Pickering by stressing the difference between expressions
made outside the work premises during off-duty hours and expressions
made on the work premises during working hours. 5 9 Second, the court
noted the specific warning and reasonable opportunity Phillips was
given to remove the objectionable poster before any disciplinary action
was taken.160 While Phillips indicates the ability of government to re-
strict an employee's freedom of expression ii4 certain circumstances, its
value as a precedent which would resolve the issues in Byrd is limited
152. Kannisto v. City of San Francisco, 541 F.2d 841, 844 (9th Cir. 1976).
153. 491 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1974).
154. Id. at 952.
155. Id.
156. In the action, brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985
(1964), Phillips contended that his First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been
violated.
157. The district court had granted the defendants' summary judgment motion. 491 F.2d
at 952.
158. 491 F.2d at 955-56.
159. Id. at 955.
160. Id. at 955-56.
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at best. The disputed expression in Byrd was made outside work prem-
ises during off-duty hours and the police department, unlike the proba-
tion department in Phillps, failed to give the penalized officers a
specific warning before it invoked sanctions.
If the reasoning in Phillps and Kannisto is inapplicable to the is-
sues in Byrd, then how did the Byrd Court balance the competing in-
terests necessary for reaching its determination? The court of appeals'
short opinion provides only a few clues. Judge Goodwin seemed to
agree with the district court's finding when he stated that "the First
Amendment does not guarantee the plaintiffs an unqualified platform
from which publicly to hector their department and its superior officers
by language calculated to inflame the public or part of it against the
police and to affect adversely the morale and discipline of the depart-
ment." 6' Presumably, this assertion signifies that the plaintiffs' expres-
sion caused some actual impairment of a governmental interest. Many
courts have required that the impairment of the governmental interest
must be material and substantial before a speech-based sanction can be
sustained.'62 The only state interest enunciated in Pickering which the
court identified in Byrd was the disruption of discipline and harmony
among co-workers. 163 The questionable police tactics utilized in the
Zebra manhunt, however, were at least as responsible for the public
controversy and resulting discord among police employees as were the
plaintiffs' public criticisms.
Perhaps the most enlightening clue in attempting to explain the
result in Byrd is Judge Goodwin's refusal to bring the plaintiffs within
the Pickering line of cases which guarantee school teachers a First
Amendment right to publicly criticize their school and its officials.
1' 4
According to Goodwin, "[s]ubstantial differences between the public
interest in education and the public interest in safety and order justify a
difference in the standards by which the respective institutions may
protect themselves from attempted destruction by their employees."' 6 5
While these differences have been recognized by other courts, they
have generally not been viewed as substantial enough to make Picker-
ing inapplicable.'66 The proper approach is to classify the unique char-
161. 558 F.2d at 554.
162. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976); Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036,
1047-50 (9th Cir. 1976); Tygrett v. Washington, 543 F.2d 840, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Smith v.
United States, 502 F.2d 512, 518 (5th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 339 (10th Cir.
1973); Battle v. Mulholland, 439 F.2d 321, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1971); Teachers Union Local
1021 v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 71 Cal. 2d 551, 563, 455 P.2d 827, 835, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723,
731 (1969).
163. 558 F.2d at 554. See text accompanying note 161 supra.
164. 558 F.2d at 554.
165. Id.
166. See e.g., Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 1977); Hanneman v.
Breier, 528 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1976); Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir.
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acter of police employment as but one element in the balance of
interest in an individual case.
167
The Byrd opinion does not contain a thorough examination of the
various factors which Pickering indicated should be considered when
determining whether a public employee's speech is constitutionally
protected. Rather, the Byrd court determined that the existence of two
variables supporting the state's interest in suppression was sufficient to
surpass any interest supporting First Amendment protection. Such an
analysis overlooks the public's substantial interest in free and open de-
bate about its police department's operations as well as Byrd's and
Tapia's free speech interests.'
68
The public has a strong interest in hearing a police officer's state-
ments concerning his or her department, especially when the comments
are directed towards departmental procedures which allegedly infringe
upon the rights of a substantial portion of the populace. If such proce-
dures are in need of change or investigatrion, the police officer's opin-
ion should be encouraged because he or she speaks as an expert. 169 By
disciplining a police officer for critical public comments and thereby
discouraging such dialogue between police employees and members of
the public, the police department can only alienate the community in
which it works and advance a lack of trust in the policeman.
70
When a police officer's criticisms are directed towards police tac-
tics directly affecting the general populace rather than police personnel
or internal departmental affairs, the interests supporting protection of
the comments are similar to those associated with the speech of an ordi-
nary citizen. Pickering implies that the fact that the statements are not
directed at a person with whom the speaker must deal on a daily basis
tends to support the position that the courts should protect the
speech. 17 1 The Ninth Circuit recognized this concept in Kannisto.1
72
1970). The Supreme Court has emphasized that "policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are
not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights." Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
167. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
168. In Pickering, the Supreme Court recognized these interests and discussed the vari-
ous factors which might support them in a particular case. See text accompanying notes 57-
59 & 68 supra.
169. The opinion of a police officer on matters of police service and procedures is just as
valuable to the public as a teacher's opinion on a matter which concerns the school system.
In Pickering, the Court asserted that "[t]eachers are, as a class, the members of a community
most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation
of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out
freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal." 391 U.S. at 572.
170. See 10 National Comm'n on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Law and Order
Reconsidered 298-304 (1969) (staff study report).
171. See 391 U.S. at 569-70.
172. See 541 F.2d at 843-44. See also Bernasconi v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No.
3, 548 F.2d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Any disruption of superior-subordinate relations or of harmony among
co-workers which results from such critical speech is presumably
caused by the unpopularity of the expressed viewpoint. Speech of this
type should be highly valued since it stimulates political debate which
is essential to a free society. 173 In a paramilitary organization such as
the police department there exists a constant danger of repression of
unpopular ideas. This is due in part to the common backgrounds and
attitudes police employees often share.'74 In focusing on the harmful
effects of public employees' speech, Pickering may have indicated that
the Court did not fully appreciate this subtle but potent means of sup-
pressing dissident behavior. Pickering may also be interpreted in such
a way as to provide for those situations in which the right to contem-
plate and voice unpopular opinions is so precious to the preservation of
our country's democratic ideals of free speech that it outweighs any
minimal disruptive effect. 175 The reaction of superiors and other em-
ployees who share the prevailing views should not be permitted to chill
the rights of dissidents.
176
Since no mention of the substantial interests which support the
protection of Byrd's and Tapia's speech can be found in the Byrd opin-
ion, one may conclude that such interests were not recognized, or per-
haps deemed not relevant to the disposition of the case. This deduction
creates serious doubts concerning the court's understanding of the Pick-
ering balancing test and its ability to apply the proper standard. The
Pickering test cannot function properly if the mere showing that a po-
lice officer's speech has caused some disruption disposes of the issue.
The balancing process requires the trier of fact not only to determine
the existence and extent of the harm to the governmental interest
caused by the disciplined employee's speech, but also to weigh that in-
jury against the employee's and the public's interest in the speech.
177
Byrd exemplifies the dilemma which plagues a public employee
when a court balances opposing interests to determine whether his or
her speech is constitutionally protected. Clearly, many factors listed in
Pickering which support the employee's and public's interest in free
-speech were present in Byrd.178 The existence of so many anti-suppres-
sion ingredients with respect to the limited number of factors favoring
restriction could easily have led the plaintiffs in Byrd, or even an attor-
173. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 20-26 (1960). According to Meiklejohn,
"What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be
said." Id. at 20.
174. See S. AsCH, POLICE AUTHORITY AND THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 35 n.18
(1968).
175. See Policeman, supra note 77, at 548-49.
176. See id. at 549.
177. See 391 U.S. at 568.
178. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
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ney acting as an advisor, to believe that their critical comments were
constitutionally protected under Pickering. Unfortunately, since the
Supreme Court failed to designate what weight should be given to each
individual factor listed in Pickering, the Byrd court, like any other
lower court, can defend its decision by stating that the factors favoring
suppression outweighed those favoring protection, regardless of the
number of factors which support protection. Even if the assignment of
fixed weights to these factors would be inappropriate, since that might
transform the fluid balancing test into a relatively inflexible stan-
dard,' 79 the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in cases such as
Byrd in order to provide lower courts with some guidelines as to how
the balancing test should properly be applied.'80
Conclusion
In Pickering the Supreme Court attempted to develop a test that
would apply to the vast assortment of factual situations in which state-
ments by public employees may be deemed to justify sanctions. The
Court, recognizing the limitations of a rigid formula, devised a test re-
quiring courts to balance factors which either support or oppose consti-
tutional protection. While some courts have felt obliged to limit their
inquiry to the specific factors enunciated in Pickering, others have
adopted Pickering in spirit, if not in letter, by incorporating into the
balance other considerations which reflect the governmental, public
and private interests connected with an employee's speech.
Since Pickering, cases dealing with the First Amendment rights of
police officers demonstrate that the wide discretion left to the courts
when they balance opposing interests has made possible the justifica-
tion of divergent results in similar if not parallel factual situations.
These differing conclusions are possible only because the Supreme
Court has not specified what combinations of factors dictate one result
instead of another. Pickering's guidelines are so vague that they practi-
cally leave the fate of a police officer, or any other public employee
sanctioned because of his or her speech, to the unrestrained discretion
of the trial court. The lack of clear guidelines creates the obvious dan-
ger that hostility to the expressed views will play a significant role in
the enforcement decision.
Because each factual situation is different and the applicable stan-
dard so flexible, a public employee often cannot know whether his or
her speech is protected until a court so decides. This is bound to have a
179. The main benefit of the Pickering test is that in the balancing of opposing interests
there exists an intrinsic flexibility which allows a court to consider the exigencies ofjustice in
a particular case without the confinement of precedent.
180. The plaintiffs in Byrdappealed to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. 558
F.2d 553 (1977), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978).
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chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights by the em-
ployee who faces potential termination for his or her speech. Many
government employees will prefer to abide by possibly unconstitutional
regulations, even if they feel strongly that their rights are being in-
fringed, since the sole alternative requires resistance with no guarantee
of ultimate vindication. It is ironic that a judicial doctrine designed to
provide public employees with many of the rights enjoyed by their col-
leagues in the private sector makes the assertion of those rights such a
tenuous proposition.' 8 ' The chilling effect created by the employee's
inability to recognize the boundaries of constitutionally protected
speech may also drastically limit the free flow of information essential
to the protection of the public interest in free and open debate about
governmental agencies.
What can be done to remedy this undesirable situation? The First
Amendment reflects our nation's "profound mutual commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials."'8 2 The suppression of speech relevant to public issues, contro-
versies and investigations inhibits the thorough discussion of public
matters necessary in a free, democratic society.'8 3 Thus, where a police
officer's or any other public employee's statements concern a public is-
sue, the need for censorship and discipline is not very compelling. Al-
though it is frequently easier to silence a critic than to respond to
criticism, under our system of government, counterargument and edu-
cation, rather than the abridgment of free speech, should be used to
expose errors in judgment or unsubstantiated opinions. 84 Accepting
the premise that free and open debate of public issues is vital to the
informed decision-making process of the electorate,18 5 the government
as an employer should not be allowed to sanction its employees for
making serious contributions to public discussion on matters of general
interest. Where the matter is already one of public awareness, and no
need for confidentiality exists, it should not be necessary for a court to
balance conflicting interests. In such a situation, the right to comment
181. See Rosenbloom & Gile, supra note 116, at 275.
182. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
183. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Brennan, The Supreme Court and
the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965).
184. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962).
185. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 29 n.17 (1978) (Stevens. J., dissenting); Klein-
dienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969);
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968).
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should be constitutionally protected, regardless of the speaker's occu-
pation.
This is not to say that the Pickering test is unworkable. The fun-
damental difficulties present in regulating government employee
speech are not entirely the result of the balancing test's amorphous
guidelines. Blame for the lower courts' inconsistent application of the
Pickering standard may also be placed on the Supreme Court's unwill-
ingness to provide guidance as to how the test should be applied to
varying factual situations. Until the Court delineates what combina-
tions of the factors outlined in Pickering mandate the extension of con-
stitutional protection, judicial inconsistency will abound. The Court
can begin solving this problem by granting certiorari in cases such as
Byrd v. Gain.

